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Abstract. This paper presents an innovative and flexible approach for 
recommending the number, size and composition of purchasing groups, for a set 
of hospitals willing to cooperate, while minimising their shared supply chain 
costs. This approach makes the financial impact of the various cooperation 
alternatives transparent to the group and the individual participants, opening way 
to a negotiation process concerning the allocation of the cooperation costs and 
gains. The approach was developed around a hybrid Variable Neighbourhood 
Search (VNS) / Tabu Search metaheuristic, resulting in a flexible tool that can be 
applied to purchasing groups with different characteristics, namely different 
operative and market circumstances, and to supply chains with different 
topologies and atypical cost characteristics. Preliminary computational results 
show the potential of the approach in solving a broad range of problems. 
Keywords: purchasing groups, healthcare, Tabu Search, VNS 
1   Introduction 
In the last decades there has been, in most OECD countries, a continuous growth in 
health expenditures as a share of GDP (see some examples in Figure 1). Although this 
economic effort has been accompanied by significant improvements in health services 
(illustrated in Figure 1 by the evolution of Infant Mortality and Life Expectancy at 
Birth), there is a collective concern for control of costs and for systems efficiency. 
In Portugal, hospitals are accountable for approximately 38% of total current 
expenditure on health, and more than 80% of it arises at public hospitals (i.e., hospitals 
included in the National Health Service, NHS) [1]. In 2010, 55% of the 231 hospitals in 
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the country were state owned and concentrated 73% of all hospital beds [2]. Seven 
hospital systems represent more than 50% of total pharmaceuticals consumption by 
publicly managed hospitals [3]. In 2009 the supply costs accounted for 30% to 40% of 
their operational costs
1
, which is in line with the proportion observed at US hospitals 
[4]. Pharmaceuticals represent between 70% and 80% of these supply costs while 
medical-surgical materials represent between 20% and 25%. 
 
Figure 1 Healthcare evolution, 1960-2008 (source: [2]) 
In this context, hospital managers and other authorities have naturally been giving more 
importance to enhancing healthcare supply chains through cooperative purchasing 
strategies. 
From a supply chain perspective, the improvement of purchasing strategies typically 
implies intensifying integration and increasing purchasing centralisation, supported by 
information and communication technologies for real-time information sharing, and 
promoting order consolidation to reduce unit costs [5]. Thus, spontaneous horizontal 
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 Source: Hospital Systems Profit and Loss Accounts 
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cooperation between neighbour hospitals, with the objective of controlling purchasing 
costs and sharing supply chain management knowledge, should be encouraged. 
However, purchasing groups often experience difficulties in their implementation, thus 
justifying additional support to maximise their chances of success [6]. 
In this work, we propose a flexible approach to recommend and evaluate a Group 
Purchasing Organisation (GPO) structure (i.e., the number of GPOs to form, their size 
and composition) for a set of hospitals willing to cooperate, while minimising their 
shared supply chain costs. Our approach combines the recommendation of a GPO 
structure with the use of an optimisation procedure to determine the supply chain 
configuration of the resulting GPOs (i.e., where, when and in which quantities supplied 
items are stored and flow in the supply chain). This integration enables the identification 
of synergies within each possible GPO. 
The problem is solved by a two-module optimisation approach that incorporates a 
hybrid VNS / Tabu Search metaheuristc, and that can be adapted to the analysis of 
cooperative purchasing strategies in hospital supply chains involving the establishment 
of various types of GPOs. 
Our approach can be easily used to support a group of hospitals intending to form a 
GPO, since the decision makers (the managers of the hospitals involved in a 
collaboration process) only need to provide information about the structure of their 
supply chains (suppliers, distribution centres, storage locations, places where demand 
occurs, and the possible supply links between these points) and some transactional data 
(e.g., the demand of items at relevant places, prices and discount schemes of alternative 
suppliers, fixed administrative costs of establishing commercial relations with these 
suppliers, an interest rate for inventory holding cost calculation, existing storage 
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capacity constraints). In return, they get detailed reports comparing the costs of various 
cooperation alternatives. 
Moreover, the approach is flexible enough to be applied to simplified versions of the 
problem, for example, by aggregating demand at upstream points in the supply chain, 
and by considering only some of the costs. 
Schotanus [7] points out that no instruments have yet been developed to determine the 
optimal size of purchasing groups under different circumstances (e.g., different markets, 
price elasticity, etc.), Schoenherr et al. [8] highlight the need for research that improves 
the understanding of mechanisms for the design and control of processes which enable 
joint value creation and sharing (namely, sharing of cost savings resulting from joint 
cost reduction efforts), and Walker et al. [9] state that developing tools for calculating 
the benefits of cooperative purchasing is an enabler of collaboration. The proposed 
approach links GPO formation with the optimisation of the resulting joint supply chain. 
This integration points out the supply chain design directions for the specific 
cooperative situation being evaluated. Additionally, it facilitates the analysis and 
negotiation processes for cooperative purchasing initiatives, by exposing financial 
impacts for the group and for individual hospitals, thus enhancing communication and 
fostering negotiations on the allocation of cooperation costs and gains. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, we relate our problematic situation to 
cooperative purchasing, namely in a healthcare setting and taking a supply chain 
perspective, and we frame that situation by describing the evolution of healthcare GPOs 
in Portugal. Second, we explain and formulate a model for the problem. We then solve 
our model using a two-module optimisation method and we present an illustrative 
example to show the benefits of the approach. Finally, we draw some conclusions and 
propose lines for further research. 
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2   Literature review 
2.1 Cooperative purchasing 
Cooperative purchasing (also referred to as group purchasing, collaborative purchasing, 
collective purchasing, joint purchasing, consortium purchasing, shared purchasing, 
bundled purchasing, pooled purchasing, alliance purchasing, etc.) is the horizontal 
cooperation between two or more organisations in one or more steps of the purchasing 
process, by pooling and/or sharing their purchasing volumes, information, market and 
demand risks and/or resources [10,11,4]. The resulting initiatives have originated a wide 
diversity of cooperative organisations that range from informal/virtual arrangements to 
third party (formal) outsourcing, broadly designated as purchasing groups or group 
purchasing organisations (GPOs) (see a summary of possible typologies in [11]). 
In Table 1 we summarise the most frequently stated advantages and disadvantages of 
GPOs, as well as some areas where there are doubts about their benefits. Many of the 
existing research findings depend on the purchasing group type under analysis, and 
therefore it is important to clearly classify and define those types in order to identify 
which advantages, disadvantages, critical success factors, drivers and preconditions 
apply to which group type(s) [7]. Purchasing groups are much more frequent in the 
public sector [12] and an important part of the existing research on cooperative 
purchasing focuses on healthcare GPOs. In general, results from other sectors may be 
transposed to healthcare, but the special characteristics of this industry may require 
some specific analysis. Accordingly, in Section 2.3 we briefly discuss this topic further, 
focusing in a healthcare context. 
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Table 1 Group purchasing advantages and disadvantages 
At individual member level 
Advantages 
• reduction of purchasing related costs (namely, acquisition costs (e.g., [4,12,15-17]), transaction costs 
(e.g., [4,16-18]), administrative costs (e.g., [12,17,19,20]) 
• human resources savings, since some purchasing effort is transferred to the group [21,17] 
• increased information on supply markets [18] 
• increased focus on core operational activities (e.g., [17,21]) 
Disadvantages 
• standardisation decreases the ability to fulfil the needs of decentralised users (e.g., [5]) 
• lower innovation capabilities (at contract [22] and product/ service levels [23]), due to compromise 
[22], standardisation, and reduction of direct contacts with suppliers [23]  
• lower responsiveness [5], e.g., in case of a small scale emergency situation [23] 
Doubts/ Concerns 
• prices negotiated by purchasing groups may be higher than those negotiated directly with vendors 
[14] 
At group/ supply chain level 
Advantages 
• consolidation of purchase volumes enables the negotiation of more favourable terms with suppliers 
[5,17,18,23] 
• reduction of duplicated purchasing efforts (e.g., [5]), namely, through reduction of the number of 
transactions (e.g., [12,18]) 
• development of purchasing expertise [5] 
• rationalised choice through better-informed selection and standardisation (e.g., [19,23]) 
• standardisation and consolidation of purchasing volumes increase economies of scale (e.g., at 
supplier level), lowering unit costs for the whole supply chain [23,16] 
• improved ability to respond to large scale emergency situations [23], due to increased flexibility of 
inventories [18], coordination [23] and resource pooling [23]  
Disadvantages 
• coordination costs (e.g., [16,23]), mainly when GPO size increases [7] 
At macro/ political level 
Advantages 
• reduction of overall supply chain costs, that, in the public sector, implies that the amount paid by tax 
payers decreases [19] 
• in the public sector, prevention/ reduction of corruption [12, 13] 
Disadvantages 
• consolidation of sales volumes may inhibit SMEs from participating in the tenders [23,9] 
• may be a barrier to innovation, because GPOs tend to favour suppliers with broad product lines 
rather than a single innovative product [24] 
Doubts/ Concerns 
• risk of a negative effect in market dynamics due to excessive buyer concentration [25] 
• risk of a negative effect in market dynamics due to the introduction of an additional intermediary, in 
case of third party GPOs (e.g., [26]) 
• depending on the market at stake, an increase in the concentration of the buyers (demand side) may 
counterbalance the excess concentration on the supply side, improving competition conditions [25] 
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The size of the purchasing group may have a significant impact on its financial 
performance since the involvement of many members may lead to higher set-up and 
transaction costs but, on the other hand, the involvement of few members may lead to 
smaller economies of scale. Nevertheless, research has indicated that in healthcare 
purchasing there is no direct relationship between higher volumes and lower prices 
[e.g., 13,14].  
Schotanus [7] points out that no instruments have yet been developed to determine the 
optimal size of purchasing groups under different circumstances (e.g., different markets, 
price elasticity, etc.). However, it should be noted that the optimal purchasing group 
size strongly depends on the type of purchasing group under consideration (see, e.g., 
[10,11]). 
2.2 Cooperative purchasing in supply chains 
Although cooperative purchasing initiatives have been widely applied, there is very few 
research concerning the integrated analysis of purchasing groups formation with the 
coordination of the supply chains of the cooperating organisations. Our approach links 
the evaluation of the potential purchasing groups with an optimisation procedure, in 
order to determine their common supply chain configuration. This integration takes into 
consideration not only the most recognised benefits of cooperation, such as obtaining 
quantity discounts or transaction and administrative costs savings, but also other 
possible supply chain synergies, achieved, for example, through inventory pooling, 
inventory lateral transhipments, or distribution consolidation. Moreover, it supports the 
operationalization of existing supply chains to the new cooperative situation. 
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From a supply chain point of view, our approach can be viewed as being related to the 
broad supply chain coordination literature (see [27,28]) and to the literature on 
cooperative ordering / lot sizing models (see [29,30]). 
The main distinctive features of our approach in comparison with previous works are 
the following: 
• The determination of the best GPO structure (Section 3.2) for a group of cooperating 
organisations (in our case, hospitals) integrated with the multi-period optimisation of 
the resulting GPO supply chains, computing the costs of all participants and 
combining (for the first time, as far as we are aware of) the following characteristics: 
interrelated purchasing, distribution and inventory decisions; more than two 
echelons; multiple suppliers; multiple products; quantity discounts; fixed costs; path-
dependent costs; and bundled storage and supply capacity constraints. 
• Its flexibility, since it can be used to optimise problems with different supply chain 
configurations (e.g., number of echelons, suppliers, hospitals, hospital wards and/or 
products) as well as different cost types. 
2.3 Cooperative purchasing in healthcare 
Given the increasing need to rationalise healthcare services, there have been diverse 
attempts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of hospital systems through vertical 
or horizontal, and direct or indirect supply chain collaboration. Besides cooperative 
purchasing, these efforts have included the stockless system (described in [31]), Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI) systems (e.g., [32]), resource sharing/pooling by neighbour 
healthcare providers (e.g., [33,34]), e-commerce (e.g., [35]) and/or e-communication, 
namely, in the area of telemedicine (e.g., [36]), integrated care [37], and other 
integration initiatives (see [38]). 
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The full success of many of these experiences has been hindered by difficulties in 
communication, leadership or conflicting interests conciliation (e.g., [32,39-42]), or by 
suspicions about the fair distribution of costs and benefits of the collaboration processes 
(e.g., [33,41]). Communication problems [22,6] and the allocation of savings [7] are two 
of the main difficulties of purchasing groups for informally structured programme 
groups [10], i.e., groups having the characteristics of the group of our research case 
(Section 3.1). 
In healthcare these difficulties may be larger as the supply chain is managed through a 
complex line of command, based on a sensitive balance of power relationships among 
diverse highly trained professional groups (managers, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, 
etc.) that work at autonomous units [43]. The system is also highly dependent on the 
role played by physicians [44], as they develop long run relationships with suppliers and 
preferences on specific materials and products, reflecting, for example, their education 
in specific medical schools. 
The knowledge about the supply chain, and the awareness of the impacts of certain 
decisions on its operation, may improve the willingness to discuss alternative actions to 
develop collaboration between supply chain members (e.g., [45]). Moreover, as stressed 
by Ford et al. [41], understanding which individuals stand to lose or gain within a 
particular collaborative initiative can yield critical insights into the prospects for the 
success of a project. 
Burns and Lee [4] conducted an independent survey of materials managers for hospitals 
in the US, concerning their national purchasing alliance usage, and confirmed the 
conclusions of Schneller [21] that GPOs help contain rising healthcare costs by reducing 
product prices in two ways: (1) through pooled purchasing leverage of hospitals buying 
products on nationwide contracts; and (2) through the establishment of price ceilings 
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beneath which hospitals negotiate on their own. They also concluded that alliances may 
also benefit hospitals financially by reducing transaction costs. 
 
In summary, previous research has confirmed that cooperative purchasing can 
significantly reduce costs related to hospital systems purchasing activities. However, it 
is also clear how important it is to incorporate a supply chain perspective into GPO 
analysis and to prepare potential cooperation processes, by analysing and negotiating 
possible forms of cooperation and their consequences to the group and also to individual 
participants, so that adequate incentive alignment and goal congruence can be reached. 
Since GPO size and characteristics may influence the extent and nature of achieved 
benefits, models to analyse GPO formation should take these aspects into account. 
3   Problem 
3.1 Research case 
Our research was motivated by the observation of a group of neighbour public hospital 
systems that are physically close, and that have established some purchasing 
cooperation relations and launched several joint tenders. This group was formed by a 
core set of four neighbour hospital systems (totalizing 10 hospitals), responsible for 
more than 20% of the total pharmaceuticals consumption by public hospitals in Portugal 
[3], but with time has involved the participation of other systems. One of the 
cooperating hospitals is widely recognised as a centre of knowledge and innovation, and 
its initiatives are easily followed by other hospitals (belonging or not to the purchasing 
group), and consequently, the possibility of not doing business with this hospital can be 
very negative to a supplier, especially when a prestigious brand is at stake. Thus, in 
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some situations, this hospital can take the leading role in the negotiation of on-contract 
prices with suppliers. Representatives of the management teams of these hospitals meet 
weekly to discuss cooperative projects (e.g., the definition of a common master file of 
medical-surgical products, the standardisation of pharmaceuticals use, and the 
organisation of purchasing processes) or to share their experiences and opinions about 
supply chain best practices. The participating hospital systems do already share 
information as required by our approach (namely, demand and prices obtained from 
suppliers). Since all group members have strong relationships with each other and all 
can influence specifications, this purchasing group can be considered as an informally 
structured programme group [10]. 
It may be argued that the best solution for Portuguese public hospitals would be the 
establishment of a national GPO. In fact, over the years, we have seen repeated attempts 
from national health authorities to implement and manage national purchasing groups. 
However, the proportion of purchases channelled through these organisations has been 
quite small and they have recurrently experienced limited acceptance or even resistance 
from hospitals, especially when involving mandatory compliance rules. The 
introduction of healthcare GPOs in Portugal has in fact followed a path opposed to the 
commonly observed evolution phases of group purchasing development, as described 
by D'Aunno & Zuckerman [46], Johnson [16], Nollet & Beaulieu [47] or  Schotanus et 
al. [6], and probably this is one of the reasons why the results achieved by these first 
attempts have been so disappointing. Other reasons may be the heterogeneity of 
Portuguese hospital systems in terms of dimension (and consequently, demand volume), 
financial situation (and consequently, payment period) and accessibility. Since suppliers 
had to present their price offers based on a forecast of potential annual sales, without 
knowing the locations of their client hospitals, or the payment dates, the prices offered 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
to GPOs were often considerably higher than those obtained by individual hospital 
systems through direct negotiations. 
These failed experiences further reflect the gap between policy goals and the realities of 
the hospital systems involved in these purchasing groups, as identified by Schotanus et 
al. [6]. Moreover, these authors concluded that “no enforced participation” is the most 
important success factor for managing a purchasing group, since the cost-effectiveness 
of a well-organised group should attract members without forcing them to formally 
cooperate [6]. 
The four hospital systems observed in this study meet many of the favourable 
conditions for increased purchasing centralisation [48,6]: they are not direct 
competitors, since NHS hospitals access does not depend on patient choice, all members 
have a similar influence in the group and similar objectives, they are geographically 
near to each other, they have common consumption of items and purchasing 
requirements, their supply markets are often highly concentrated, the savings potential 
of purchasing cooperation is high, and their purchasing processes require high expertise. 
At the current stage, the proposed solution for this set of hospitals is the consolidation 
of purchasing cooperation, without mandatory compliance, but they need to determine 
which are the best cooperation arrangements, to anticipate the global and individual 
savings they will achieve, and to find out how to organise their joint supply chain in 
order to take the maximum advantage from cooperation. The actual needs of this group 
of hospitals, as observed in practice, were the real motivation for the approach described 
in this work. 
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3.2 Model description 
In this work we consider a cooperative game, defined on the real situation of a group of 
neighbour hospitals engaged in an information sharing process with the objective of 
purchasing items cooperatively. The motivation of these hospitals was to significantly 
decrease costs, while meeting quality and usability requirements. In past cooperation 
initiatives, they had already established some binding and benefits sharing agreements. 
In spite of these experiences and the intent to deepen cooperation, it was quite clear that 
the identification and sharing of cooperation costs and benefits was not a simple task. 
The theory of cooperative games is concerned with situations in which players (in our 
case, hospitals) can negotiate effectively. I.e., if there is a feasible change in the 
strategies of the coalition members that might benefit all of them, then they would agree 
to actually make such a change, unless it contradicts agreements of some members of 
the coalition with other outside players [49]. For this purpose, any of the 2
N
-1 nonempty 
subsets of the total set of N players under consideration is a potential coalition. 
The adoption of a cooperative game perspective makes sense in situations where the 
players have incentives to improve their game payoffs, by adding communication or 
(explicit or implicit) contract-signing options, providing some control over the actions 
of other players, with the objective of transforming the initial game into a game with 
equilibria that are better for all the players [49]. 
Cooperative games are based on three necessary conditions [41,50]: (1) every actor‘s 
motivation is known by the others; (2) legally binding agreements exist between the 
coalition members; and (3) all benefits derived from cooperation are returned to the 
members in a way they consider equitable. In case one of the previous conditions is 
absent, even if hospitals have the intention to cooperate, we have a non-cooperative 
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game and, for the GPO to survive, each player should receive at least as much from 
participating in the group as he would receive by operating unilaterally. 
In a cooperative game with more than two players, the possibility of cooperation among 
subsets of the players should be considered, and the resulting potential structure of the 
sequential negotiations between the participants of all possible coalitions is, in real 
situations, very complex [49]. 
As the problem under analysis represents a situation where an important part of the 
cooperation benefits can be measured by financial outcomes that can be transferred 
between purchasing group members, we can apply the commonly used transferable 
utility assumption. 
For the purposes of this work, a GPO (coalition) is any nonempty subset of the set of 
hospitals (players) involved in the cooperative game (i.e., those with the intention to 
cooperate with each other), and a GPO structure is a partition of the hospitals (players) 
into disjoint, exhaustive GPOs (coalitions). Therefore each hospital belongs exactly to 
one GPO, and some GPOs may be composed of one single hospital. 
Our approach compares all possible GPOs (coalitions) formed from a group of N 
hospitals (players), and recommends the GPO structure that minimizes the total cost for 
the global solution. It also provides information about alternative GPO structures and 
about the individual hospital participation in the final solution, thus supporting a 
possible negotiation phase to (re)allocate cooperation results. 
The number of possible GPO structures equals ∑ 𝑍(𝑁, 𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1 , where 𝑍(𝑁, 𝑖), known as 
the Stirling number of the second kind, is the number of GPO structures with i GPOs 
formed from N hospitals willing to cooperate. The easiest approach to enumerate 
Stirling numbers is recursion, with 𝑍(𝑁, 𝑖) =  𝑍(𝑁 − 1, 𝑖 − 1) + 𝑖𝑍(𝑁 − 1, 𝑖), and 
𝑍(𝑁,𝑁) =  𝑍(𝑁, 1) = 1. Figure 2 illustrates the case of a group of 5 individual 
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hospitals, showing how the 31 (2
5
-1) potential GPOs can be associated to form GPO 
structures.  
 
Figure 2 Potential GPOs originated from a group of 5 hospitals and how they form GPO structures 
Figure 3 lists the 52 possible GPO structures composed from those 31 potential GPOs. 
Nodes represent all possible GPO (coalition) structures. At the top of the figure, we 
have a coalition composed by all the five hospitals, and at the bottom, we have the five 
hospitals purchasing individually. Arcs represent mergers of two coalitions when going 
upwards, and splits of a coalition into two when going downwards [51]. It is easy to see 
that the number of GPO structures grows exponentially with the number of hospitals 
(e.g., if we had 9 hospitals, we would have 21147 GPO structures). 
Our approach consists of a recursive two-module method, where module 2 is a 
procedure performed inside module 1, as described in Figure 4. 
(H1, H2, H3,H4)
(H1, H2, H3,H5)
(H1, H2, H4, H5)
(H1, H3, H4,H5)
(H2, H3, H4,H5)
# 4
(H1, H2, H3,H4, H5)
# 5
(H1) (H2) (H3) (H4) (H5)
# 1
(H1, H2, H3)
(H1, H2, H4)
(H1, H2, H5)
(H1, H3, H4)
(H1, H3, H5)
(H1, H4, H5)
(H2, H3, H4)
(H2, H3, H5)
(H2, H4, H5)
(H3, H4, H5)
# 3
(H4, H5)
(H3, H5)
(H3, H4)
(H2, H5)
(H2, H4)
(H2, H3)
(H1, H5)
(H1, H4)
(H1, H3)
(H1, H2)
# 2
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
Figure 3 GPO structure graph for a 5-hospital game (adapted from [51]) 
Module 2 is intended to optimise each potential GPO supply chain, by using a modified 
version of a model developed in a previous work [52]. This model was inspired by the 
formulation from Ahuja et al. [53] considering a multi-stage, multi-level, multi-product 
production-distribution system planning problem, based on a graph representation of the 
problem. The multi-period dimension of the problem is taken into account in the model 
through the replication of the supply chain with “inventory edges” connecting storage 
areas (at hospital distribution centres and point of care units) in subsequent periods. A 
version of this problem considering one network entity at each supply chain echelon (as 
described in Section 3.3) is NP-hard, if the model includes fixed supply costs that are 
independent from supplied quantities [53]. Since our model considers this type of costs, 
while admitting more than one network entity at each supply chain echelon, it is also 
NP-hard. Furthermore, the objective function of the problem is non-linear and non-
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convex (e.g., the number of edges in a solution varies), thus increasing the complexity 
of the problem. 
 
Figure 4 Optimisation approach 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the application of this modelling logic to a very simple supply chain: 
two producers (P1 and P2), an informal GPO (i.e., a virtual organisation that centralises 
GPO purchases) and two cooperating hospitals with five point of care units each (U11, 
U12, ... U15, and U21, U22, ... U25), during five purchasing periods. A point of care unit is 
a location where final demand occurs (i.e., where it is traced). These locations may have 
a space for inventory storage. In practice, they may be wards or parts of wards. Solving 
this model means determining a relatively low cost way of fulfilling the demand of all 
the point of care units, by identifying all necessary network supply paths, i.e., sequences 
of consecutive supply and/or storage edges linking a producer to a point of care unit, 
and valued by the item quantity that is supplied through them. 
A supply edge links one network entity to another in one time period (e.g., producer 1 in 
period 1 to hospital 1 in the same period), and represents physical (or virtual, if a GPO 
is involved) supplies of items between those two entities. The flexibility of the model 
allows the decision maker to consider the alternative of supplying the point of care units 
directly from the producer (as in a VMI scheme), as represented by the direct arcs from 
the producer to the point of care units in period 1. This possibility is not graphically 
represented in the following periods to preserve the readability of the figure. 
Choose the lowest cost GPO structure from all possible 
GPO structures composed from a group of hospitals
Module 1
Optimise 
the supply chain of 
each potential GPO 
(assigning it a 
value)
Module 2
Rank by their values all potential GPOs from a group 
of individual hospitals intending to cooperate
Compose all structures using the potential listed GPOs
Evaluate GPO structures by adding the values (costs) 
of the GPOs that compose each structure
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A storage edge is represented by a dashed edge linking one network entity in one period 
to the same entity in the following period (e.g., hospital 1 in period 1 to hospital 1 in 
period 2) and represents the possibility of storing inventory at that location from one 
period to the next. 
 
Figure 5 Illustration of the model (adapted from [52]) 
 
The model considers: (1) fixed administrative costs for establishing commercial 
relationships between a supplier and a customer, e.g., costs of negotiation and contracts; 
(2) fixed and (3) variable transaction costs; (4) acquisition costs, including GPO 
margins (or discounts); and (5) inventory carrying costs [52]. In line with what has been 
observed in practice, we added an acquisition cost scheme considering bundle supplier 
discounts depending on the aggregate sales of the GPO (or individual hospital) during 
the planning horizon under consideration. 
Due to the nature of the acquisition and inventory carrying costs considered, our 
mathematical formulation cannot be based on the structure that is frequently found in 
the literature (some examples can be found in [54]), that associates the decision 
variables to the quantities that flow through the network edges. Therefore, as any item 
flowing through a specific edge can have different costs, depending on its previous path 
P1 P2
GPO
H2
U11
U12
U15
U21
U22
U25
P1 P2
GPO
H1
H2
U11
U12
U15
U21
U22
U25
P1 P2
GPO
H1
H2
U11
U12
U15
U21
U22
U25
H1
Period 1 Period 2 Period 5
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
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(see a few examples in [52]), our formulation associates the supplied quantities to the 
network supply paths (several edges) that have been used. 
In what follows we assume that all relevant data (costs, capacities, and other 
parameters) have been collected using appropriate estimation/forecasting methods and a 
hospital-specific business analysis. 
3.3   Model formulation 
 
Sets and indices 
G = {1, 2, … g, ...} – items 
C = {..., ,...} – potential GPOs (coalitions); #(C) = 2N-1, where N is the number of potentially 
cooperating hospitals (e.g.,  in a 5 hospitals problem there are 31 potential GPOs) 
R = {1, 2, ..., i, j, ...} – network entities (suppliers, hospitals, intermediaries, and point of care units) in a 
potential GPO  
K  = {1, 2, … k, ...} – network supply paths for potential GPO  
H = {1, 2,  ... h, ...} - hospitals; H  is a subset of R 
E = {1, 2,  ... e, ...} – demand entities (point of care units); E is a subset of R 
𝐸𝛾
ℎ – demand entities that are part of hospital h; 𝐸𝛾
ℎ are subsets of E 
L = {1, 2,  ... l, ...} – suppliers; L is a subset of R 
 =organisation (maybe virtual or informal) that centralises potential GPO  purchases;  is a subset of 
R 
S = {1, 2, ..., p, t, ... smax} – periods of the planning horizon 
CS = {… , ...} – GPO (coalition) structures (e.g.,  in a 5 hospitals problem we have 52 potential GPO 
structures) 
Figure 6 illustrates the way each node or edge is identified. An edge can be classified as 
a “supply edge”, if it links different entities in the same period, i.e., when
   i j p t   , or as a “storage edge” if it links one entity in different, consecutive 
periods, i.e., when    1i j t p    . 
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Figure 6 Edge (ip, jt) links entity i in period p to entity j in period t  
Costs 
aij = fixed administrative cost of establishing a commercial relationship between entity i and entity j 
fij = fixed transaction cost from entity i to entity j 
vgij = cost of transacting one unit of item g from entity i to entity j  
bgip = rate (applied to the aggregated acquisition cost) used to calculate the cost of maintaining one unit of 
item g stored at entity i from period p until period p + 1 
wglj = price at which supplier l sells each unit of item g to entity j 
mgij = commercial margin that intermediary j adds to the acquisition cost of item g when he/she buys one 
unit of it from supplier i 
 
Other parameters 
dgjt = demand of item g by entity j in period t 
SCi = storage capacity of entity i 
FCgip = supply capacity of item g by entity i in period p
 
 
Decision variables 
 
Qgk = quantity of item g that flows through path k 
 


 

otherwise 0,
p) t( i)(j with k,path   tobelongs jt) (ip, edge if 1,
ipjtkX  
 
 = GPO structure 
 
1, if  GPO    belongs  to  GPO  structure  
  
0, otherwise
 






 
 
Intermediate variables 


 

otherwise 0,
) ji(t)(p if i.e., edge,supply  a is jt) (ip, if 1,
ipjtY
 
(ip, jt)ip jt
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

 

otherwise 0,
 ) ji(1)p(t if i.e., edge,  storage a  is jt) (ip, if 1,
ipjtZ
 
It must be noted that supply edges are never storage edges and the opposite is also true. 
Additionally, all edges in the model should be either supply or storage edges.
  
ipjtk ipjt1, if the supply link between i and j is used, i.e., if X Y 1,  with  
0, otherwise
gk
ij g p t
Q (i, j) i, j R
A


  
 



 
 
egkrs = acquisition cost of one unit of item g at the entry of node rs (i.e., at the entry of entity r at the 
beginning of period s) belonging to path k 
 
qglj = aggregated quantity of item g bought by entity j to supplier l  
 
ogkrs = aggregated inventory carrying cost of one unit of g at the entry of node rs (i.e., at the entry of 
entity r at the beginning of period s) belonging to path k 
 
Total fixed administrative cost =
 

i j
ijij aA      (1) 
Total fixed transaction cost =
 

k i p j t
ijipjtipjtk fYX     (2) 
Total variable transaction cost =
 

k i p j t
gijgkipjtipjtk vQYX    (3) 
Total acquisition cost =
 

g k i p
gkgkipQe      (4) 
  
with:          
 
                egkip, if Ziprs=1,        (5)  
egkrs  =   
   ,)(1)(
  
 
   

i p
rj
j
st
t i p
rj
j
st
t
ipjtipjtkgijipjtipjtkglj YXmYXw
  (6)
 
if Yiprs=1, SsRrKkGg  ,,,   
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where, 
0
1
1
1 2
,  0
,  
... ...
,  
glj glk
glj glk
glj
n
glj n glk
w if q
w if q
w
w if q

 

  

 
 

   
   
with: 
q
glj
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
 






jGgLiQYX
k i p j t
gkipjtipjtk  if        ,,     ,
)()(  if                   ,,                        
        ,
h
k i p Ej t
gkipjtipjtk
k i p Hj t
gkipjtipjtk
EjHjLiGg
QYXQYX
h





  (7) 
The above expressions allow us to model the following requirements. When passing 
through a storage edge (5), the acquisition cost of one unit of item g is maintained but, 
when passing through a supply edge (6), this cost is adjusted considering the price at 
which entity i sells item g, or the commercial margin that intermediary j adds to the cost 
at which he acquires one unit of that item. The value of the demand used to determine 
the price at which supplier l sells each unit of item g to entity j (7) is computed by 
aggregating all the demand channelled through the informal organisation that centralises 
each potential GPO purchases or all the demand channelled through the individual 
hospitals (including their point of care units) during the planning horizon considered. 
The model does not assume enforced GPO participation, i.e., hospitals can buy directly 
from suppliers. 
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Total inventory carrying cost =
 

g k i p
gkgkipQo , with:    (8) 
 
     ogkip, if Yiprs=1,
 ogkrs =    
 gkip gkrs gkip grs iprsk iprso e o b X Z  , if Ziprs=1,    (9) 
S, pRiSsRrKkGg γ   with ,,,,   
 
The unit inventory carrying cost (9) is maintained when passing through a supply edge, 
and it is adjusted when passing through a storage edge. This adjustment is done by 
using a rate (applied to the aggregated acquisition cost) that considers the cost of 
maintaining one unit of item g stored at entity i from period p until period p + 1. 
Model 
Module 1: 
Minimise ( ) ( )V V 
 
  

       (10) 
Module 2: 
 
V() = Min 





i j
ijijaA +
k i p j t
ijipjtipjtk fYX +
 
+
k i p j t
gijgkipjtipjtk vQYX +  

g k i p
gkgkipQe  + 




g k i p
gkgkipQo
   
(11) 
 
 
 
Subject to: 
00 1,jtk
j t
X k K          (12) 
1, , ,iprsk
i p
X k K r R s S             (13) 
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1, , ,rsjtk
j t
X k K r R s S             (14) 
 
k j t
rsjtrsjtkgk
k i p
iprsiprskgk
k i p
iprsiprskgk YXQZXQYXQ
maxmaxmax sss
...  
. , , ,
maxs
gk rsjtk rsjt grs
k j t
Q X Z d g G r R s S            (15) 
TpRiGgFCYXQ gip
k j p
ipjtipjtkgk  ,,,.      (16) 
RiSCZXQ i
g k i p
ipjtipjtkgk  ,.      (17) 
KkGgQgk  ,,integer and 0       (18) 
  CKkTtpRjiAZYX ijipjtipjtipjtk   ,,,,,,1,0,,,,    
(19) 
Our objective is to find the GPO structure, *, with the minimum cost (10), with the 
cost of each GPO structure being the sum of the values of the GPOs that compose that 
structure. 
The global cost of each GPO  is obtained through the minimization (11) of the sum of 
fixed administrative costs (1), fixed (2) and variable (3) transaction costs, acquisition 
costs (4) and inventory carrying costs (8) of the solution obtained for the corresponding 
supply chain configuration problem.  
Constraints (12) ensure that all paths begin at the network artificial node 00 (located 
upstream from the producers), and constraints (13) and (14) ensure that, for each path k, 
only one edge arrives at each node rs and only one edge departs from each node rs, 
guaranteeing that paths are formed to serve demand entities. 
Constraints (15) ensure flow conservation at the different entities and impose that all 
demand is satisfied. 
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Constraints (16) and (17) impose capacity bundle restrictions: they ensure that all 
supply capacity (16) and warehouse storage (17) limitations are taken into account. 
Finally, constraints (18) and (19) define the domains for the decision variables. 
4   Solving the model 
Since we are studying a case with a limited number of hospitals, the optimisation of the 
GPO structure (module 1) is performed through the computation and comparison of all 
the costs of the structures under consideration. If we wanted to apply our approach to a 
case with a significantly larger number of hospital systems, module 1 would have to be 
modified to avoid determining and comparing the costs of all GPO structures. This 
could be done by using an algorithm for coalition structure generation. Voice et al. [55] 
present brief descriptions of several available algorithms for this purpose. 
To optimise the supply chain of each GPO (module 2), we use a hybrid algorithm based 
on Tabu Search (TS) [56,57] and Variable Neighbourhood Search (VNS) [58]. We use a 
metaheuristic to solve this problem because it is a NP-hard, non-convex mixed-integer, 
non-linear problem (MINLP). Additionally, we want our tool to be easily adaptable to 
solve real size problem instances with diverse cost characteristics. Due to their features, 
metaheuristics are well suited to solve complex cross-functional supply chain 
management problems [59]. Further details about the construction and parameterization 
of this algorithm are discussed in Rego and Pinho de Sousa [52], but in this paper, for 
self-containment reasons, we will only present the main characteristics of the adopted 
approach. 
Our hybrid algorithm combines the search scheme of a Tabu Search, by incorporating a 
tabu list that forbids repetition of recent moves, with the diversification features of 
VNS, by changing the neighbourhood structure when the search seems unable to 
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improve the current solution. This method provides the flexibility required to cope with 
a great diversity of problems (e.g., in terms of types and number of entities and/or types 
of costs and constraints considered), and is suitable to handle a great variety of real life, 
highly combinatorial situations. 
4.1 Initial solution 
An initial solution is constructed through an iterated creation of network supply paths, 
until all demand is satisfied. Each path is formed by starting at a point of care unit, and 
by adding supply or storage edges, until one of the producers is reached. The edge that 
arrives at the last node in the path is chosen by selecting randomly its node of origin 
from all possible origins. Feasibility was considered an important requirement, since the 
constrained nature of the problem may complicate the attainment of a feasible solution 
during the search. If the demand of the point of care unit cannot be fully fulfilled due to 
a supply or storage constraint, the path under construction will be valued with the 
feasible quantity and another path will be constructed for the remaining quantity. 
4.2 Objective function 
The objective function has two components: the original objective function of the 
problem (see Section 3.3) plus a function P that penalizes infeasibility associated to the 
limits imposed by storage and supply constraints: 
(capacity excess )gk g
g k
P  
 
   
  
 ,      (20) 
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where: 
• capacity excessgk is the sum of the quantities in excess of item g flowing through 
network supply path k due to storage and supply constraints; 
• ηg is a parameter that adjusts the penalization to the scale of the costs considered (in 
our algorithm, ηg is the higher unit price charged by the producers of item g); and 
• ε is a dynamic parameter (updated every κ iterations) that is multiplied (divided) by 2 
if the search stays in unfeasible (feasible) regions (in our case, the initial value of ε is 
1, and κ =10). 
4.3 Neighbourhood structures 
Due to the specific characteristics of the costs considered in our model, where the cost 
of sending a given quantity through one edge depends on the network supply path that 
quantity travelled before, we could not define the neighbourhood of a solution by 
employing the most usual and simple moves, such as insertion or swapping of elements. 
Therefore, we move to a neighbour solution by swapping complete or partial network 
supply paths, as exemplified in Figure 7, where we highlight two partial paths that could 
be swapped (ending in H2) and two complete paths that could be swapped (ending in 
U15). During the search process we allow some temporary occurrences of infeasible 
solutions, and follow a best improvement strategy (i.e., the entire neighbourhood is 
searched). 
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Figure 7 Examples of network supply paths swapping 
 
We developed three neighbourhood structures: two cost based procedures (NS1 and 
NS2) and a random neighbourhood scheme. We combine all types of moves by running 
each of these three neighbourhood structures during a given number of iterations, pmax 
(in our case, we set pmax = 500). 
NS1 selects the paths with the minimum unit cost, ignoring the current solution 
structure (i.e., the selection does not take into account the fact that other paths of the 
current solution may use edges that are common to the path under analysis). NS2 selects 
the paths with the minimum unit cost, but considering the current solution structure. 
Finally, the random neighbourhood structure selects a new path by randomly choosing a 
chain in a way that the capacity constraints are satisfied. 
4.4 Tabu list 
The tabu list stores the last combination edge  path  item of a number of recently 
replaced paths, so that it is not possible to include these edges in the paths that will be 
tested to form new solutions. The tenure of the tabu list is randomly determined using a 
uniform distribution - Uniform [; ], where  is 1/3 of the number of network 
P1 P2
GPO
H2
U11
U12
U15
U21
U22
U25
P1 P2
GPO
H1
H2
U11
U12
U15
U21
U22
U25
H1
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elements, and  is the number of network nodes. This way, the tenure of the tabu list is 
adapted to the size of the supply network of each GPO analysed. 
4.5 Aspiration criterion 
We use an aspiration criterion based on the global objective, by accepting a tabu 
solution if it yields the best solution ever found, even if it results from a tabu move. 
5   Illustrative example 
Assume that we want to design the GPO (coalition) structure for five potentially 
cooperating hospitals that intend to purchase two items offered by two competing 
suppliers, during five purchasing periods. They want to serve the demand of five point 
of care units per hospital, taking into account the specific features of the supply chains 
of these hospitals. Since small intensive purchasing groups are more successful when all 
members have a similar influence and similar objectives [6], we considered that the five 
hospitals are similar in terms of their size (measured through their demand volumes for 
both items 1 and 2). 
These five hospitals
2
, or subgroups of them, may form virtual/informal GPOs to 
aggregate demand volumes, thus obtaining lower item prices, and eventually a reduction 
of other purchasing costs. We have randomly generated demand, costs and constraints, 
using, as an inspiration, the characteristics of the supply systems of the research case 
under analysis (e.g., the types of costs). The point of care units were classified as units 
of high demand or units of low demand, according to a binomial distribution with p = 
                                                 
2
 A network with 2 suppliers, 1 GPO, 5 hospitals and 5 point of care units per hospital, and a planning horizon of 5 purchasing 
periods has 165 nodes. 
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0.5. Demand was determined through a normal distribution: N(=100, =20) or 
N(=50, =20) for high or low demand, respectively. Costs were generated using the 
distributions shown in Table 2. The relative values of the various costs are realistic, and 
the generated demands and suppliers’ prices represent well those from real items. 
The developed algorithms were implemented in C++ and executed on a PC Intel Core 2 
CPU 7200 2.2 Ghz. 
In 30 runs to optimise the grand GPO (i.e., the GPO that aggregates the five hospitals), 
the hybrid VNS / Tabu Search algorithm took 5 minutes and 19 seconds on average, to 
perform an average of  7728 iterations to reach the best solution. The average run time 
(until the activation of the stopping criterion) was 8 minutes and 4 seconds, and the 
coefficient of variation of the solution values was 0.012. 
To determine how the five hospitals should cooperate, we analysed the outcomes of the 
31 possible GPOs (coalitions) they could form. For each GPO, we considered the 
solution corresponding to the best of 10 runs of the hybrid algorithm. Then, we 
compared all the 52 possible GPO structures composed from the 31 GPOs, in order to 
minimise the global costs of the five hospitals. Figure 8 shows the percentage of savings 
that could be achieved through the 51 different cooperative solutions, when compared to 
a situation of no cooperation, and Table 4 compares the three best solutions formed by 
all the five hospitals with a no-cooperation situation. In Table 4, we can also observe 
that, although the five hospitals have similar sizes in terms of their demand for items 1 
and 2, their costs (e.g., average variable unitary cost), when in a no-cooperation 
situation, are not the same. 
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Table 2 Distributions used to generate data3 [52] 
acquisition 
cost 
Base cost 
Item1: 
Uniform [100, 120]; 
Item2: 
Uniform [50, 70] 
Quantity discount structure 
Order quantity Discount 
[0, LS1[ 0% 
[LS1, LS2[ Uniform [0%, 5%] 
[LS2, LS3[ Uniform [5%, 10%] 
[LS3, +∞[ Uniform [10%, 20%] 
inventory 
carrying cost 
Uniform [1/1000, 3/1000] 
commercial 
margin 
producer→GPO 
Uniform [-10%,-1%] 
 
 
producer→care unit 
GPO→care unit 
hospital→hospital or care 
unit of other hospital 
Uniform [5%,10%] 
GPO →hospital 
hospital→hospital 
Uniform [2%,7%] 
fixed 
administrative 
cost 
producer→GPO 
producer→hospital 
GPO →hospital 
Uniform[1000,1500] 
producer→care unit 
GPO→care unit 
hospital→hospital or care 
unit of other hospital 
distribution identical to the 
one of the hospital where 
the care unit belongs 
hospital→hospital 
Uniform [500,1000] 
 
fixed 
transaction 
cost 
producer→GPO 
producer→hospital 
GPO →hospital 
hospital→hospital 
Uniform [200, 500] 
producer→care unit 
GPO→care unit 
hospital→hospital or care 
unit of other hospital 
distribution identical to the 
one of the hospital where 
the care unit belongs 
hospital→care unit of the same 
hospital 
care unit→care unit of the same 
hospital 
Uniform [10,20] 
variable 
transaction 
cost 
producer→GPO 
GPO →hospital 
hospital→hospital 
Uniform [1,10] 
producer→ 
hospital 
hospital→ 
care unit of 
other 
hospital 
Uniform 
[5,10] 
producer→ 
care unit 
Uniform 
[10,15] 
 
GPO→care 
unit 
Uniform [5,15] 
 
hospital→care 
unit of the same 
hospital 
care unit→care 
unit of the same 
hospital 
Uniform [5,15] 
Note:  LS1=25% of total demand / no. of periods  
LS2=50% of total demand / no. of periods  
LS3=75% of total demand / no. of periods 
 
 
One of the advantages of our approach is the possibility of analysing not only the effects 
(e.g., in terms of costs) of the various cooperating strategies in the network as a whole 
but also the impact of the global optimisation on each of the hospitals and point of care 
units. This possibility, making the different impacts visible, is a pre-condition to a fair 
distribution of cooperation costs and gains, since all participants can analyse in advance 
the financial consequences, to the group and to the participants, of all possible 
cooperation arrangements. This will simultaneously determine which hospitals should 
cooperate when purchasing a specific set of items, according to up to date relevant 
                                                 
3
 The detailed data sets are available in electronic format upon request. 
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market conditions. This can also be used to support the negotiation between these 
participants on how to allocate financial results of that cooperation. 
 
Figure 8 Total cost savings of various cooperative solutions vs. non-cooperative solution 
Table 3 Best cooperative vs. non-cooperative solutions 
  
Table 4 Best non-cooperative solutions: comparison of individual hospitals 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 present the costs of the best cooperative solution: hospitals 1, 3 and 
5, forming a purchasing group; and hospitals 2 and 4, forming another group. The fixed 
costs of these purchasing groups have not been allocated to individual hospitals as that 
distribution would imply the application of some subjective distribution criterion. In a 
real negotiation process, hospitals can decide which criteria to use. We can observe, in 
the example, the various impacts of cooperation on individual hospitals: see, for 
-3%
-1%
1%
3%
5%
7%
9%
1 GPO 2 GPOs 3 GPOs 4 GPOs
Amount % of Savings
Initial 
Situation
No cooperation: each of the 5 hospitals has 
an isolated purchasing strategy / network: 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8
2,153,115 -
All 5 hospitals cooperating: creation of 1 
GPO, (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
1,974,990 8.27%
(1,2,5), (3,4)          2 GPOs 1,974,770 8.28%
(1,3,5), (2,4)          2 GPOs 1,972,041 8.41%
Best 
cooperating 
solutions
Solution Solution description
Total Cost
Item 1 Item 2 Item 1 Item 2
1 1536 1664 117.26 70.03 296,639 92,060 388,699
2 2088 1674 116.74 76.46 371,762 70,454 442,216
3 1769 2522 121.49 78.06 411,783 83,203 494,986
4 1120 1910 121.70 80.00 289,112 92,146 381,258
5 1832 1767 118.99 77.93 355,680 90,277 445,957
Total - - - - 1,724,975 428,140 2,153,115
Total costHospital
Demand
Average variable unitary 
cost
Variable 
costs
Fixed costs
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example, the average variable unitary cost of the hospitals within each purchasing group 
(Table 5). Similarly, we also have different percentages of reduction in variable costs. 
The information provided by the model should then be used by the five hospitals to 
decide how to allocate the financial results of their cooperation effort. For example, 
given the intentions to cooperate expressed by the five hospitals, and as a consequence 
of the results obtained, a negotiation may be initiated between groups (2, 4) and (1, 3, 5) 
aiming at implementing a solution where all five hospitals cooperate (with 8.27% 
savings instead of the global 8.41% of the optimal solution). In this situation, hospitals 2 
and 4 may accept to transfer part of their savings to hospitals 1, 3, and 5, as long as they 
obtain a result that overcomes the 2.0% savings that they would attain if they stayed 
isolated in a group (see Table 6). Alternatively, the five hospitals may decide to 
organize their purchases through the two GPOs recommended in the optimal solution, 
thus maximizing their global savings, and simultaneously implement a share scheme 
that involves the transferral of some of the resulting financial gains from (1, 3, 5) to (2, 
4). 
It must be noted that the perception of fairness for the allocation of gains of a 
collaboration by the parties involved often involves some subjective elements and may 
be quite dependent on the situation under analysis (e.g., on the distribution of power 
among parties) [60].  
Table 5 Best cooperative vs. best non-cooperative solutions: comparison of average variable unitary costs 
 
No 
cooperation
Cooperation
Reduction 
(%)
No 
cooperation
Cooperation
Reduction 
(%)
1 117.26 96.67 17.6% 70.03 59.59 14.9%
2 116.74 98.67 15.5% 76.46 60.26 21.2%
3 121.49 97.30 19.9% 78.06 57.95 25.8%
4 121.7 99.95 17.9% 80 59.54 25.6%
5 118.99 97.15 18.4% 77.93 60.03 23.0%
1 117.26 97.25 17.1% 70.03 68.84 1.7%
3 121.49 99.21 18.3% 78.06 69.48 11.0%
5 118.99 101.12 15.0% 77.93 67.77 13.0%
2 116.74 115.37 1.2% 76.46 73.44 4.0%
4 121.70 115.95 4.7% 80.00 73.54 8.1%
(1, 3, 5)
(2, 4)
Item 1 Item 2Purchasing 
groups
Hospital
Average variable unitary costs
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
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Table 6 Best cooperative vs. best non-cooperative solutions: comparison of costs 
 
A comprehensive sensitivity analysis revealed that the algorithm operates as expected. 
As an example, it is interesting to analyse the effect on the total cost of the possible 
GPOs (see Figure 9), and on the final cooperative solution (see Figure 10) of the 
changes experimented in two of the cooperation related variables – the fixed 
administrative costs of establishing a commercial relation (aij), and the quantity 
discounts offered by the suppliers (wglj). 
When the fixed administrative cost increases, the total cost of the various possible GPOs 
rises (see Figure 9), as expected. In this situation, there will be a higher incentive to 
cooperate, because joint solutions allow the GPO members to engage in less 
commercial relations. This was what happened in the GPO structure solution: when the 
fixed administrative cost is higher, the solution recommended by our approach 
corresponds to the grand GPO (see Figure 10). 
When the quantity discounts increase, if the required item quantity volumes are attained, 
prices decrease and subsequent commercial margins and inventory costs do also 
decrease. As a consequence, as expected, the total cost of the various possible GPOs 
decreases (see Figure 9). We can observe that larger GPOs take a better advantage of 
this situation than small GPOs (e.g., on average, a rise of 10% in the quantity discounts 
decreases the grand GPO total cost by approximately 3%, while the total cost of a GPO 
No 
cooperation
Cooperation
Reduction 
(%)
No 
cooperation
Cooperation
Reduction 
(%)
No 
cooperation
Cooperation
Reduction 
(%)
1 296,639 247,633 16.5% 388,699
2 371,762 306,889 17.5% 442,216
3 411,783 318,267 22.7% 494,986
4 289,112 225,657 21.9% 381,258
5 355,680 284,044 20.1% 445,957
1,724,975 1,382,490 19.85%   2.153.116   
1 296,639 263,929 11.0% 92,060 388,699
3 411,783 350,730 14.8% 83,203 494,986
5 355,680 305,010 14.2% 90,277 445,957
2 371,762 363,826 2.1% 70,454 442,216
4 289,112 270,315 6.5% 92,146 381,258
1,724,975 1,553,810 9.9% 428,141 418,231 2.3% 2,153,116 1,972,041 8.41%Total
Total costs
(1, 3, 5) 245,451 7.6% 1,165,120 12.37%
Purchasing 
groups
Hospital
Variable costs Fixed costs
(2, 4) 172,780 -6.3% 806,921 2.01%
8.27%
Total
428,141 592,500 -38.4% 1,974,990
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
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formed by two hospitals will only decrease approximately 2%). Additionally, there will 
be a higher incentive to cooperate, since the consolidation of purchased volumes will 
enable GPOs to access prices that are lower than they were before, and only larger 
GPOs can purchase the quantity needed to reach the better prices. When the quantity 
discounts are higher, the solution recommended by our approach is, as expected, the 
grand GPO (see Figure 10). 
We must recall that our work assumes that the involved GPOs are informally structured 
programmes, and consequently, in this illustrative example, larger GPOs are not 
hindered by rising GPO coordination costs associated with GPO size. The results 
obtained are, therefore, in accordance with the characteristics of the modelled situation. 
In other contexts, if much larger and formal GPOs were involved, we could have a 
different behaviour as the observed direct relation between higher fixed administrative 
costs and higher quantity discounts and cooperation could be counterbalanced by the 
impact of a rise on GPO coordination and operation costs. Our approach can, however, 
be easily adapted to analyse problems with different cost structures. 
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Figure 9 Sensitivity analysis: GPOs total cost  
 
Figure 10 Sensitivity analysis: GPO structure solution  
6   Conclusion 
The approach proposed in this paper can be quite useful in supporting the design and 
evaluation of alternative cooperative purchasing strategies for healthcare supply chains. 
Given the combinatorial nature of the problem and the dimension of real life instances, 
we have designed a computational procedure based on metaheuristics. Moreover, the 
flexibility of the approach allows its application to purchasing groups with quite 
different characteristics, namely in order to perform experiences concerning the optimal 
size of purchasing groups under different operative and market circumstances, and 
involving supply chains with different topologies and atypical cost characteristics. 
The approach can also be used to promote and facilitate the cooperation process, since it 
is easily applicable, and it makes the financial impact of the various cooperation 
Savings relative to 
NO cooperation (%)
Savings relative to 
NO cooperation (%)
Percentage change in fixed administrative cost
Percentage change in quantity discount
Best solution
2nd best
-5.6% -9.6% -12.8% -15.8%
Total cost change (%)
Best solution
2nd best
Total cost change (%)
8.4% 11.2% 13.0% 14.2% 15.2%
13.4% 11.3% 5.2% 5.7% 3.4% -0.7%
6.3% 5.8% 9.3% 7.4% 7.6% 11.2%
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
(1, 4, 5), (2, 3) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4) (1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 4, 5), (2, 3) (1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4)
(1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 4, 5), (2, 3) (1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4) (1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4)
4.2% 6.1% 8.3%
9.2% 8.5% 8.4%
-10.8% -7.5% -6.1% -4.8% -3.8% 1.4% 2.6%
(1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4)
13.0% 10.8% 11.1% 11.1% 11.0% 8.4% 9.1% 9.4%
(2, 3, 4, 5), (1) (1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4) (1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
(1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4) (1, 3, 5), (2, 4) (1, 2, 5), (3, 4) (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%-50% -40% -30% -20% -10%
 
 
 
 
37 
 
alternatives transparent, opening way to negotiation processes concerning the allocation 
of the costs and gains of cooperation between the participating hospitals.   
Preliminary computational experiments show the potential of the developed approach in 
solving quite different cooperative purchasing problems. These experiments have been 
designed for illustrative purposes, but we believe that the future incorporation of these 
tools in a Decision Support System can significantly contribute to an increase of 
healthcare supply chains efficiency and encourage the establishment of cooperative 
partnerships between their members. 
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